Washington DC
Over and above the financial crisis and the presidential election campaign – there are still other important issues. These include the relationship between the West and Russia, again coming very much to the fore in the context of the Georgia conflict.
Count Lambsdorff clearly refuted the description of these links as a “strategic partnership” as formulated by German ex-chancellor Schroeder and former President Putin. Following Lambsdorff the contents of these relations will clearly have to follow the following guidelines: The West should pursue a joint and constructive approach, work for co-operation where possible, but - if necessary - not shy away from confrontation.
Count Lambsdorff looked back on Russia’s development after the end of the Cold War, because this was the only way of gaining an understanding of Russia’s perspective: Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia had tried to push aside its defeat in the Cold War. The democratic opening under President Yeltsin had also brought about social and economic chaos. From a Russian perspective, NATO’s eastern enlargement meant that this was a geo-strategic and offensive organisation, although it had been founded as a defensive military alliance. When President Putin took over, a revisionist stage had begun in Russia that covered both home and foreign policies. In the eyes of Putin, the end of the Soviet Union represented a geo-political catastrophe.
In this context Count Lambsdorff supported the linkage between inside and outside policies. A lack of effective democratic structures in a given country will be reflected in its foreign policy. Today, Russia presented a democratic façade. Behind it, however, democratization had factually failed. Although there was not much cause for optimism in this respect, the West should not abandon the democratic forces of Russia, but should continue supporting them.
Count Lambsdorff afterwards referred to the Caucasus situation. The United States had deprived itself of a chance to function as a mediator by its unilateral support for Saakashvili, an authoritarian nationalist. The European Union had found a joint position on this conflict and it therefore had been able to fill the gap left by the United States. Despite all the understandable anger over Russia’s actions in Georgia one had to keep a realistic view: The “frozen conflicts” in the countries of this region where large Russian minorities lived were broadly in Russia’s interest and because of these frozen or potential conflicts these countries did not meet internal conditions for rapid NATO membership. The Crimean peninsula and the related problem of Russia’s Black Sea fleet was another hot spot.
Concerning the matter of Russia’s possible isolation Count Lambsdorff feels that: „Benign neglect is not an option“ – at least not for the European Union. The entire West was in continuous need of co-operation with Russia, for instance as regards the Middle East peace process and Iran’s nuclear policies. With that in mind, communication channels between the West and Russia ought to be kept open. Lambsdorff was against Russia being ejected from the G8 group. A certain disillusionment on the Russian side, regarding its chances within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, might offer a chance to Russia also to view the country’s self-interest in ongoing co-operation with the West.
Summarizing, Alexander Count Lambsdorff used four words to characterize the course that had to be taken vis-à-vis Russia: “Unified, smart, realistic, and consistent”.
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